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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE
CHRISTENSEN and JAHES
N. TUCKER,

Case Nos. 16147, 16040
and 16019

Defendant-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants, KENNETH SHARP and GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, were
convicted as charged of the offenses of Aiding Escape and Theft
of an Operable Hotor Vehicle in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge presiding.

This brief is

intended to apply to appellants KElJNETH SHARP and GEORGE CHRISTENSEN and treats only the conviction of the crime of Aiding Escape.
Appellants KENNETH SHARP and GEORGE CHRISTENSEN join in a separate
brief dealing with the conviction of the crime of Theft of an
Opecable Motor Vehicle.
DISPOSITION m THE LOWER COURT
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinneywere
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided by thefor
Institutethe
of Museum
and Library
Services
Appellants
sentenced
to prison
term
as provided
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by law for both charges, which sentences were to run concurrently,
after a jury found them guilty of the offenses of Aiding Escape
and Theft of an Operable Hotor Vehicle.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment rendered on both
counts, or in the alternative, a new trial.
STATEHENT OF THE FACTS
At the trial in the above entitled matter, Glenn Hudson,
a Records

Identif~cation

Officer at the Utah State Prison, testified

regarding the status of the three appellants in the above entitled
action on the date of April 19, 1979.

After laying a foundation

regarding the records that he had in his possession, State's
Exhibit 2-S was admitted which showed that the appellant JAHES Il.
TUCKER had been committed to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by law for a crime of Rape, of not less
than one nor more than fifteen years.

Also admitted were records

purporting to be an order for a 90-day evaluation for the appellant
KENNETH SHARP (State's Exhibit 5-S) and a similar order for the
appellant GEORGE CHRISTENSEN (State's Exhibit 6-S).
On the face of the above documents it appeared that the
appellant JAHES N. TUCKER was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison
pursuant to a valid commitment ''hile the appellants SHARP and
CHRISTENSEN were in the Utah State

Pr~son

only for the purposes

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of testing and evaluation.
Paul Christensen testified that on the 18th day of April,
1978, he was employed at the Utah State Prison and that he knew
all three of the appellants (R. 205).

Mr. Christensen testified

that on the day in question he had taken the three appellants out
to work in an area of the farm on the Utah State Prison grounds.
Some hour and a half later, he returned to discover two shovels
together in one portion of the ditch, and a third shovel at the
other end of the field (R. 220).
Mr. Christensen then reported the three appellants missing.
He further testified that some time later he was called to an area
in Butterfield Canyon where he made an indentification of two
of the appellants, SHARP and CHRISTENSEN.
Eleanor Collard testified for the State that on the 19th
day of April, 1978, she was employed and on duty for Riverton
City.

She further testified that around 3:00 in the afternoon

she had an occasion to see three young men walking down the street
side by side (R. 231).

Darlene Ruark testified for the State

that on April 19, 1978, she was working at Save More Television
at approximately 12600 South on Redwood Road (R. 238).

She further

testified that on that day at approximately 2:45 she observed
three males in front of t:he windows in the store (R. 2"-0).

Marsha

Ruark testified that on April 19, 1978, she was also at Save More
Television and that she arrived there betv1een l: 00 and l: 30 in the
Sponsored by
Law 1971
Library. Funding
for digitization provided
the Institute
of Museum and
Library Services
afternoon
inthe S.J.
a Quinney
white
Cadillac.
Some bytime
bebveen
2:30
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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obser~ed

3:00 she

a person to

shor::y thereaf:er, she

~eard

~al~ ~r~e~:-,
a~

e~g~~e

in~o

:~e

s:J=e

sta=t.

front door and looked out to observe '":.er ca:: ":Jei:::g cri·:e:-,
(R. 249).

a~~

a~,·a·,

Mars:Ca ?-uark f'-lrt:Cer test::.:::.ed ::':at s:Ce ga·:e r.o one

permission to take

~er

car from the place where it was parked

on the day in question.

:~s.

Ruark reported the

t~eft

o: her

automobile to the police authorities and Leonard Soock and o::icer
wbipple, among others. le::t i::: purs;.:i: o::

t~e

vehicle.

c::ice::

'>~nipple

spotted the ·.rehicle and several officers joined in a

chase.

The Cadillac proceeded at a high rate of speed,

runni:-~g

cars off the road a;--,c r·..mning a stop sign in at least one location
(R_ 289).

Severa:

to 70 and 80 m. p. :-,.

~alice
1

?,.

of Butterfield Canyon.

cars pursued the vehicle at speeds up

291),

event'.lally following into an area

The total distance of the

approximately five miles (R. 299).

c~ase ~.;as

The appellant, JA}!ES :l. 7T:CKE?.,

was observed by the officers to be driving

t~e

vehicle.

At the conclusion of the chase, the appellants SHARP and
GIRISTE:·lSE~l,

passengers in the vehicle, abandoned

t~e

vehicle,

fled in one direction and were captured shortly t~ereafter.

The

driver, TUCKER, fled in another direction and Has subsequentl?
apprehended in the neighboring vicinity by a citizel'! in the area.
:1a::sha and Darlene Ruark testified that,

~hen

::hev had recovered

the vehicle later, the license plates had not ":Jeen removed o::
altered and that the vehicle did not appear :o ]e dacaged, excep:
tor
being covered '.vi th dirt and sr..eared -,.,::_ :::h :~e "d:.:s t" :::"'.a::: ~-.-a~
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used to test for fingerprints on the vehicle (R. 243, 253).
Appellant TUCKE~ testified under oath that on the 19th day
of April, 1978, he 'vas in the Utah State Prison on a cormnitment.
He also testified that on April 19th he was put on a work detail
and he left on his own and without any aid froQ the appellants
SHARP and CHRISTENSEN (R. 233).
Appellant TUCKER further testified that some time later
he ran into the other two appellants in Riverton.

He said that

he had been drinking during the course of the morning while at the
prison, and that in Riverton he began to sober up to the point
~.;here

he resolved to go back to the prison.

He and appellant

SHARP started to hitchhike back towards the prison, when appellant
CHRISTENSEN drove up in a 1971 Cadillac.

Appellant TUCKER testi-

:ied that they then resolved to drive around a little bit before
going back to the prison and turning themselves in (R. 237).
Appellant TUCKER further stated that when he saw the
police he panicked and fled in the vehicle.

He ended up driving

to the Butterfield Canyon area, where he was subsequently apprehended.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANTS, SHARP AND CHRISTENSEll, WERE INAPPROPRIATELY CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF AIDI~lG
ESCAPE HHEN THEIR ACTUAL OFFENSE, IF ANY, WAS
THE CRIME OF ESCAPE, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR.
Appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN have been charged and
convicted under Utah Code Ann.

§76-8-310 (1953), which provides

in pertinent part:
Aiding Escape--(1)
A person is guilty of an
offense it:
(a) he aids another person to escape from
official custody, .
(2) An offense under this section is a felony
of the second degree if: . .
(b)
a person to whom the aid or item to
facilitate escape is given is a prisoner
confined in the state prison; .
Appellants contend that the State produced insufficient evidence
to warrant a conviction on the offense of Aiding Escape for reasons
stated below.
A.

I:HEllT ELE}!ElJT

Both the principal offense of Escape, Utah Code Ann.
§76-8-309 (1953) and Aiding Escape, Utah Code Ann.
(1953) lack a specific intent requirement.

§76-8-310

Ctah Code Ann.

§76-2-102 (1953) provides that every offense not involving strict
liability shall require a "culpable mental state." \,'"here a c:Jarticular statute does not specifv a culpabie mental state

require~
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for the offense, §76-2-102 states a requireQent of intent, knowledge or recklessness.

Thus, for the offenses of escape and aiding

escape, either an intentional, knowledgeable or reckless mental
state of the accused to commit the offense must be proven.
Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953)

Utah

requires that:

Every person, acting with the mental state required
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be liable as a party for such conduct.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, the mental intent for the principal offense and the aiding
offense must be the same.

Appellant TUCKER, as the principal

offender, intended his escape while appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN
did not share TUCKER's intent to effect their escape.

The fact

that TUCKER and the other two appellants were seen with each other
after appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN escaped is no evidence
that they assisted each other in escaping from the prison farm,
and does not evidence intent on appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN's
part, either intentional, knowing or reckless,
escape.

to effect TUCKER's

There is no evidence in the trial record to indicate

that appellants intended to aid TUCKER in his escape.

"Aiding"

means that "the aider must stand i:1 some relation

':O

::ts the criminal, approach it from the same angle,

c•uc:h it at the

same :Joint, and posses criminal intent".
385 (Ariz. 1965)
CoJe Ann.

§76-2-202).

the crime

State v. 3earden, 405

(Arizona Aiding Statute

simi~::tr

to Utah

Appellants, present at the prison farm for
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a 90-day evaluation, possessed only the intent necessary to effect
their escape, which would constitute a Class B Misdemeanor.

The

fact that TUCKER later joined them and the fact that TUCKER was
a prisoner lawfully confined, were mere fortuitous events for
which appellants should not be held accountable for absent the
intent to commit the crime for which they were charged and convicted.
B.

ESCAPE

Escape is defined as the unla,vful departure of a prisoner
from the limits of his custody.
(Idaho 193'"-J

State v. Jones, 36 P.2d 530

?eoole v. Quijada, 199 P.854 (Calif. 1921)

(prisoner

unlawfully going beyond "'alls of prison is guilty of escape and
not attempted escape,

though he was captured while within the

territory connected with the prison grounds).

Appellants contend

that the escape of TUCKER was complete when TUCKER walked away
from the prison groun·ds and ended before he joined appellants.
Hhere the escape is complete, and absent evidence of aiding
(see infra), the conviction cannot stand on an aiding escape
charge.

In State v. Faulk, 136 So.601 (Fla. 1931) the Court, in

regard to common-law escape, determined that "once the prisoner
has succeeded in getting beyond the custody of and out of sight of
the custodian, the escape is complete."

136 So. at 603.

A

prisoner, who was where he had no right to be without permission,
even though it was not clear whether he was within or without the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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area owned by prison, was guilty of escape where he removed himself from "the imposed restraint over his person and volition."
People v. Quinters, 241 N.W.2d 251 (Mich. 1976).

According to

TUCKER's own testimony, he joined appellants after his escape was
complete in terms of his removal from the imposed restraint over
his person and volition.
Orth v. United States, 252 F.566 (C.A.4 1918), involved
a prisoner who had escaped from an Atlanta, Georgia prison in
August and appeared in Charleston, South Carolina, where the
defendant resided.

There was evidence that the defendant aided

and protected the prisoner and assisted him in leaving Charleston.
Defendant was convicted of aiding an escape but the Circuit Court
of Appeals found:
The evidence furnished no foundation for conviction
of the charge of aiding Fay to escape from lawful
custody.
Hhen the physical control has been ended
by flight beyond immediate active pursuit, the
escape is complete.
After that aid to the
fugitive is no longer aiding his escape.
~
Wharton, Cr.L. 2606; 1 Russell on Crimes, 467,
10 R.C.L. 579; Smith v. State, 8 Ga. App. 297,
68 S.E. 1071; State v. Ritchie, 107 N.C. 857,
12 S.E. 251.
252 F. at 568.
Physical control over TUCKER was ended when he walked away
from the prison farm and entered the town of Riverton.
evident

That is

from his testiQ0ny when he entered a bar for a drink.

-::':1e escape was complete 2nd any aid to EcCKER after that Has not
aiding an escape.
,\ppe llan ts con tend, in fact,

that even if the escape •vas

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not complete,

the evidence does not show that they aided TUCKER.
AIDI!lG ELE}1ENT

C.

Aiding means to incite, encourage, instigate, or supplement commission of an offense.
(N.M. 1972); State v. Roberts,

State v. Atwood, 492 P.2d 1279
336 P.2d 151 (Ariz. 1959).

To aid an escape or to aid in the general sense requires
an intent to give aid and pricipal offender must know of the intent to give aid, Maxwell v. State, 43 So.2d 323 (Ala. 1949),
and if there is no prearrangement or preconcert between persons
charged with crime, mere presence of one of them to give aid if
necessary is not

~iding

unless principal offender knew of such

presence with intent to aid.
(Ala. 1976); State v.

Wright v. State, 333 So.2d 215

Cydzik, 211 N.W.

2d 421 (Wise. 1973).

It

is not essential that there be a prearranged concert of action,
however, in the absence thereof, it is essential that the aider
£hould in some way advocate or encourage the commission of the
crime.

Coleman v. State, 121 A.2d 254 (l1d.

1956).

There is no

evidence indicating that appellants intended to assist TUCKER in
any means nor that appellants were even a'vare of TUCKER's intentions.
Also, TUCKER did not indicate that he knew of appellants alleged
intentions to assist him.

The record si!7tpl? shows appellants

engaging in a Class B Xisdemeanor escape when TUCKER happened along.
There was no preconcert, no arrangement, no plan or
There was mere presence of the appellants '"i th

co~on

TUCI~ER,

design.

who, b:' his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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escape, committed a felony.

Mere presence, absent a showing of

criminal intent, is not enough.

\lright v. State, supra.

In

addition acquiescence in the actions of another is insufficient
to constitute "aiding".

State v. Stark, 490 P. 2d 511 (Ore. 1971).

Appellants merely acquiesced to TUCKER's committed felony.

Any

action taken by appellants while in the presence of TUCKER was
not for the benefit of, or to "aid, assist, encourage or supplement" TUCKER's acts.

Their conduct does not fall within the

purpose of the statute.
D.

PUBLIC POLICY

In reviewing cases wherein defendants were convicted of
aiding an escape under statute, the obvious purpose of the statutes,
similar to Utah Code Ann.

§76-8-310, is not aimed at appellant's

conduct.
Even in situations where prisoners act in concert when
each is endeavoring to effect his

ow~

escape, there is stronger

evidence than in this case of conduct that falls within the statute.
In Luke v. State, 49 Ala. 30 (1873), two persons confined in jail
under charges of felony, acting in concert, set fire to the jail
for the purpose of burning a hole through which they may escape,
each intending to effect his

ow~

escape.

The defendants acted

::.:ct:ent:ionally tO\vard a corr.mon purpose, i.e.

breaking out.

There

i3 no such evidence in the instant case.
In People v. Creeks, 149 P.82l (Cal. 1924), there was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Pvidence of a conspiracy to escape.

There was no evidence in

appellants' case of intent to aid TUCKER much less conspire to
aid him escape.

In State v. Navarro,

163 A. 103 (Me. 1932),

the evidence showed that defendant was told that some prisoners
had escaped, drove to the jail and was later found with the
escaped prisoners.

The Court found this conduct to fall under the

aiding an escape statute.
the prisoners.

The Court found an intention to assist

In State v. Cooper, 272 A. 2d 557 (N.J. 1971),

defendant's acts consisted of breaking out of his cell block,
opening the other cell block and attempting to take over the
prison

whic~

aided in the escape of other prisoners.

Appellants'

conduct certainly is not consistent with those acts which have
been found to constitute the aiding of an escape under statutory
law and, hence, is not under the purpose of the statute.
E.

CONFLICTING STATUTES

Appellants were charged and convicted under Utah Code
Ann.

§76-8-310 (1953):
Aiding escape--(1) A person is guilty of an
offense if: . . .
(a) he aids another to escape from official
custody;
(2)
An offense under this section is a felony
of the second degree if:
(b)
a person to whom the aid or item to
facilitate. escape is given is a prisoner
confined in the state prison;
l

Historv:
§76-8-310.-

l.

C.

1953, 76-8-310, enacted b? L. 1973, ch. 196,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellants contend that their conduct is more specifically covered
by Utah Code Ann.

§76-8-309 (1953):

Escape--Term for escape from state ~rison-
(1)
A person is guilty of escape i he
escapes from official custody.
(2)
The offense is a felony of the second
degree if: . .
(b)
the actor escapes from confinement
in the state prison.
Oth2rwise, escape
is a Class B Misdemeanor.
\,'here appellants were not "confined" but rather at the prison for
a 90-day evaluation, the grade of offense applicable is a Class B
Misdemeanor.

It is clear that the above statute is more narrowly

drawn than Utah Code Ann. §76-8-310 (1953).

The above statute

specifically singles out prohibited conduct as charged against
appellants, i.e. escape.
Rules of common law statutory interpretation as well as
rulings by the Utah Supreme Court clearly establish the proposition
that when DvO statutes encompass the same criminal conduct, the
more specific statute or the latest statute to be enacted should
be applied.

State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 143, 453 P.2d 146 (1965).

The Shondel case is directly on point to the case at bar.
That case involved an overlap of the Drug Abuse Control Law and
the

~larcotic

session at

Drug Act which were both enacted during the same

t~e

1967 Legislature of Utah.

possession of the drug LSD.

Shondel was charged with

The Drug Abuse Control Law provided

a misdemeanor penalty for that offense while the Narcotic Drug

C. 1953, 76-8-309, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196,
Historv:
§76-8-309.·
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Act made the same offense a felony.

The Supreme Court held that

the clear, specific and lesser penalty prescribed for the offense
of possession of LSD was applicable rather than the more sever
penalty provided by overlapping provisions at the Narcotic Drug
Act.

Accord, Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d ll08 (Utah 1977), State

v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978).
In State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969),
the Utah Supreme Court ruled on a similar matter.

In that case,

the defendant was convicted of utterinp, a forged prescription.
The Supreme Court ruled that an amendment by the Legislature
making the uttering of a forged prescription subject to legislative fiat, one of which would penalize an accused as a misdemeanant and the other as a felon, gave accused the benefit of
being accountable only for the lesser of the two penaltiesIn the case at bar,
were convicted,

the statute under which appellants

§76-8-310, was enacted at the same time that the

more applicable statute, §76-8-309, was enacted.

The Utah Supreme

Court noted in both the Shondell and Fair decisions that where
there is a conflict between the legislative acts, the latest
will ordinarily prevail.

That rule is obviously not controlling

here where the statntes were enacted at the same time. The holding
of Shondell, Fair,

RaiT~el

and Loveless, supra, that the clear,

specific and lesser penalty prescribed shall be applied when two
statutes encompass the same conduct in controlling.

The statute

under which appellants ''ere convicted is not specific and narrm-1
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when

co~pared

to the more applicable statute, §76-8-309.

In

Shondell, supra, the Court stated:
Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule
that where there is doubt or uncertainty as to
which of two punishments is applicable to an
offense an accused is entitled to the benefit
of the lesser.
453 P.2d at 148.
Since §76-8-309 refers specifically to an escape and appellants
would be punishable only as to a Class B l1isdemeanor, as compared
to the §78-6-310 Second Degree Felony penalty, appellants are
entitled to the benefit of that lesser punishment under §76-8-309.
Numerous jurisdictions have also held that where a statutory conflict exists, the more specific provision or statute will
be applied.
322 P.2d 381,

In Bateman v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah,
7 Utah 2d 221 (1958), the Utah Supreme Court was

faced with a dispute between the Board of Examiners and the Board
of Education as to which body had the authority to administer
the Department of Education.

The Court noted that general rule

of statutory interpretation that "as to conflicting statutes, the
more specific takes precedence over the general . .

Bateman,

supra, 381 at 389.
The premise is well established that when two statutes
conflict the more specific statute governs.
Compensation fund,

See 3arum v. State

134 P.2d 505, 30 C.2d 575 ,''_=iY.6); Ex Parte

Shull, 146 P.2d 417, 23 C.2d 745 (1944); State v. Backman, 368

P 2d 793, 149 Colo. 542 (1962); In Interest of Waterman, 512 P.2d
466, 212 Kan.

'326 (1973).
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There is an indisputable rule of statutory construction
which is applicable to the case at bar:
the same criminal conduct,
governs.

\Jhen two statues encolilpass

the more narrow or specific statute

Related to that doctrine is the rule that where there

is doubt, the accused should be given the benefit of the lesser
penalty.

Since the escape statute, §76-8-309, covers more speci-

fically the appellants' conduct and the penalty under that statute
is lesser, appellants are entitled to the the benefit of that
statute.
CONCLUSION
Appellants contend, given the inappropriate nature of
the charge of Aiding Escape, that the conviction for the crime
of Aiding Escape should be reversed and a judgment of acquittal
should be entered, or in the alternative, that the appellants
should be granted a new trial.
DATED this

day of October, 1979.

BRAD RICH
Attorney for Appellant Sharp

KEVIN KL'R\J1AADA

Attorney for Appellant Christensen
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